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INTRODUCTION
Stephan Landsman *

Awarding damages for noneconomic injury, particularly pain-andsuffering damages in tort cases, has become the focus of a heated debate in the United States. The debate pits tort reformers, corporate
America, and much of the medical profession against injured individuals, consumer groups, and trial lawyers. Their interchanges have been
marked by extremes of rhetoric and a paucity of data. The Eleventh
Annual Clifford Symposium seeks to provide some much needed information and analysis regarding this topic by drawing together leading scholars to consider such questions as the legal and social
foundations of noneconomic (or general) damages, the fairness of
awarding them, areas of law where they are particularly important,
and the impact of reform efforts on those seeking such awards.
Do pain-and-suffering damages have a continuing role to play in
civil dispute resolution? Are noneconomic damages important to the
development of the law? Has reform been sensible and fair? These
and a substantial number of other questions are considered in the articles that follow.
The Symposium begins with a sharp attack on general damages by
Richard Abel. His title neatly presents his argument: General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian
(But Otherwise a Great Idea).' Mark Geistfeld continues the critical
scrutiny of such awards by suggesting that, in light of Supreme Court
precedent about punitive damages, pain-and-suffering awards may be
vulnerable to due process attack. 2 He goes on, however, to suggest at
least one way out of the difficulty he identifies. Robert Rabin picks
up on the theme of the debatable legitimacy of awards for pain and
suffering, eventually identifying points "that firm up the base for rec-
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ognizing the legitimacy of pain-and-suffering recovery." '3 He, however, casts doubt on the "make-whole" rationale often relied upon.
5
4
In the next two articles, Anthony Sebok and Stephen Sugarman
explore other nations' approaches to the pain-and-suffering question.
These pieces provide an important comparative perspective highlighting the divergent doctrinal commitments that produce strikingly different approaches to award making. In his analysis of divergence,
Stephen Sugarman suggests that, among other things, the different
ways in which lawyers are compensated for their services may play a
major role in the variation between American and foreign pain-andsuffering awards. He observes that contingency fee financing has the
effect of dramatically reducing American awards and that general
damages may be essential to ensure fair compensatory payments. In
light of these insights, Sugarman argues that the introduction of caps
on noneconomic damage awards without some form of fee shifting is
likely to work a considerable injustice on American tort victims.
John Goldberg takes up the point broached by Robert Rabin about
whether noneconomic tort damages should be viewed as a mechanism
to make victims whole. 6 After a careful examination of doctrinal origins, he argues for "fair compensation" as a more appropriate conceptualization, one that can introduce greater flexibility into our
approach to damage awards. Benjamin Zipursky then returns to the
question of caps. 7 He builds an intellectual framework for tort theorist engagement in the debate about caps on pain-and-suffering damages that emphasizes a principled protection of rights, defense of
systemic integrity, and thoroughgoing scrutiny of the practical implications of change. Reform and our ability to pursue it intelligently is
also the subject of Joseph Sanders's article: Why Do Proposals Designed to Control Variability in General Damages (Generally) Fall on
Deaf Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad).8 Sanders argues for more
serious consideration of proposals likely to produce horizontal equity
3. See Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for
Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (2006).
4. See Anthony J. Sebok, Translating the Immeasurable: Thinking About Pain and Suffering
Comparatively, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 379 (2006).

5. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards, 55
L. REV. 399 (2006).
6. See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (2006).
7. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Coming Down to Earth: Why Rights-Based Theories of Tort
Can and Must Address Cost-Based Proposals for Damages Reform, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 469
(2006).
8. 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489 (2006).
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in tort damages awards and considers why these proposals have
gained so little traction.
Powerful challenges to two very different tort theory shibboleths
come next. Margo Schlanger focuses on the shortcomings of "optimal
deterrence" as a justification for reform. 9 She explores substitution
effects that may lead potential defendants to change their conduct, not
to maximize safety, but to take advantage of the ease of proving certain sorts of precautions at trial or because they reduce the possibility
of tortious conduct being detected. These reactions suggest how subtly and adversely well-intentioned, theory-based reforms can affect
behavior. Then Robert MacCoun brings a skeptical social science
perspective to claims that media bias in reporting on tort awards is
motivated by sympathy toward large corporations.1 0 He argues that
various formal features of trials are far more likely than ideological
bias to be producing the skewed reports that focus on large awards
and give a misleading impression about the operation of the tort
system.
The human cost of suffering and making claims about it occupy the
attention of the next two symposium contributions, those by Ellen
Pryor1 1 and Lee Taft. 12 Pryor focuses on the plaintiff's lawyer. She
develops a series of suggestions about how counsel should go about
the difficult tasks of dealing with a client who is in pain and about
proving that pain without exacerbating it. Lee Taft looks at what another player, the defendant, can do about a victim's suffering. He is
particularly interested in the power of apology but decries the trend to
use it as a tactic rather than a sincere acknowledgement of wrongdoing and signal of willingness to make amends. These two articles are
augmented by the next paper in the symposium, from Edward Hickling and his colleagues, which assesses the psychological impact of liti13
gation on claimants.
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin return us, one last time, to the
debate about caps on pain-and-suffering damages.1 4 In the context of
9. See Margo Schlanger, Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 517
(2006).
10. See Robert J. MacCoun, Media Reporting of Jury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the Distribution)
Wagging the Dog?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 539 (2006).

11. See Ellen S. Pryor, Noneconomic Damages, Suffering, and the Role of the Plaintiffs Lawyer, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 563 (2006).

12. See Lee Taft, On Bended Knee (With Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2006).
13. See Edward J. Hickling et al., The PsychologicalImpact of Litigation: Compensation Neurosis, Malingering, PTSD, Secondary Traumatization, and Other Lessons from MVAs, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 617 (2006).

14. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635 (2006).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:249

Texas reform experience, they document the pernicious effect of cap
legislation. They find that caps, at least as adopted in Texas, rob victims (especially children, women, and the elderly) of access to counsel
and, hence, a day in court, by making their claims financially unattractive to plaintiff-side lawyers. Michael Green rounds out the Symposium with a fascinating paper about the intersection between
causation and damages. 15 He suggests that the way we think about
damages has serious implications for the resolution of some of tort's
most difficult and esoteric problems about duplicate harm and multiple sufficient causes.

15. See Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causationand Damages, 55
671 (2006).
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